Israeli activities in the Horn of Africa and its impact on the security of the Red Sea

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Introduction

Africa constitutes one of the most important circles of international competition. This continent was the glory of the greedy countries. The greedy colonial countries maintained their relations with Africa in the military, economic and cultural fields. The variables of conflict, differences, competition, and apprehension remained factors that form the background of the Israeli political scene in its relationship with the surrounding countries. The same influential role of "Israel" and the future of its relationship, the degree of its usefulness and its interests with countries, even though the motive of the security concern has shaped its confrontations in the past five decades, with other motives to extend its interest towards the countries located in the Horn of Africa, especially Ethiopia when it was occupying 1080 km along the Red Sea coast The western region through its annexation of Eritrea.The focus of "Israel" on the Red Sea region and the Horn of Africa to secure a foothold and influence in it to form a first and necessary step to ensure and continuity of penetration, and the importance of the region was reflected through the geographical, political and economic advantages that it possesses. This region represents an important strategic dimension by virtue of its distinguished geopolitical locations, especially that the Red Sea is geostrategically linked to the Arabian Sea and the ocean India on the one hand, and the Mediterranean, Black and Atlantic Oceans on the other.

Israel found its opportunity to penetrate the holes that resulted from the withdrawal of Soviet forces from the Red Sea. To the same extent, the Israeli strategy, which is characterized by a long spirit and the ability to employ opportunities, had to adapt to the nature of the important variable on the Red Sea, which was the emergence of the Eritrean state in 1991, and the retreat of Ethiopia to its geographical closure, especially since the change coincided with the events witnessed in the region and had its impact. On the Israeli trends, including the Thirtieth Aggression on Iraq, which resulted in the imposition of sanctions that affected Iraq's role in the Arab world and the accompanying US occupation, and the shift in the course of the struggle to liberate Palestine in the wake of the signing of the Oslo Accords and its aftermath. In light of that atmosphere, the Israeli-Eritrean relations were strengthened to form one of Israel's most dangerous steps on the Red Sea in its confrontation with Arab power, or Arab strategic transfer.

Key words: Africa, Red sear, Israel, Arab and conflict

Importance of the Research:

The research hypothesis stems from a hypothesis based on whether the Israeli strategy was formed as a result of the presence of common features, goals and interests. Therefore, the Horn of Africa region constitutes commercial and military importance and important links of the commercial centres on the Red Sea, while making it the focus of Israel's attention, which poses a threat to the Horn of Africa, but also to the Arab nation through finding a foothold on the Red Sea, and the latter is the main arenas witnessing aspects of the Arab-Israeli conflict, especially as Israel is working hard to control the Red Sea and the Horn of Africa.

Research Methodology: The multiplicity of approaches that the research has produced in reaching the goal of this strategy, we have seen that we follow in this research the historical method in addition to the political, descriptive and analytical method, while making use of the comparative method.

Research Structure: The study of the research was divided into two axes. The first axis dealing with the first topic: the geopolitical importance of the Horn of Africa. The second axis was concerned with the study of the Red Sea in the Israeli perception, then its conclusion.

The Title of the First Axis

1. **The Geopolitical Significance of the Horn of Africa**

The African continent has been a site of competition between the major international powers for long periods. European friction with Africa began through explorers, traders and missionaries since the fifteenth century, when Portuguese ships sailed to the coasts of Africa. This continent has geographical, political and economic importance due to its geopolitical location, as it controls the southern entrance to the Red Sea and overlooks the north-western coasts of the Indian Ocean, and is close to the oil fields in the Gulf and the Arabian Peninsula, in addition to that it contains 85% of the sources of the Blue Nile River, which is the

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lifeblood for Egypt and Sudan(Abdel-Malik, 1997; AIbright, 1979; *Symposium on the Red Sea and Arab National Security - Center for Studies on Arab Unity*, 1997).

Africa's connection to the Red Sea has given it a geopolitical importance to the whole region and by virtue of the connection of the Red Sea to the Arabian Sea and the Indian Ocean, Africa is characterized by its bordering to the Red Sea and strategic importance to the Arab countries and to "Israel" alike. Friction began with them and control of the commercial and strategic outlets of "Israel" in Africa, Israel has achieved success with most of the African countries that represent the key to the "Israeli" presence in them, as it has contributed to economic projects and training operations for the armies of Ethiopia, Uganda, Tanzania and Kenya, and despite the relative setback that the presence faced. However, Israel succeeded in maintaining strong relations with Ethiopia and Kenya, and established alliances with Ethiopia, Eritrea and other African countries for the purpose of besieging the Arab countries and constantly threatening their national security.

Israel maintained its policies in Africa as an extension of its policy in the Red Sea aimed at establishing a strategic depth for it, a policy that began to take its real dimensions since 1957 in order to strengthen its relations with African countries, especially Ethiopia and Eritrea, which have a long and vital maritime strip on the Red Sea, as Eritrea It has a strip extending on the Red Sea for about (1080) km, in addition to the fact that the border between it and Ethiopia is close to Bab al-Mandab. As for "Israel", what is happening in Eritrea is of great importance to it, given that it is located on the coast of the Red Sea and close to its southern entrance, which attaches importance to preserving freedom of navigation on the one hand, and to confronting the Arab strategy in this field on the other hand.

Israel is working to terminate the Arab force, especially since the only Arab force on the Red Sea is an extension of support for the Palestine Liberation Organization, and from here, "Israel" worked in coordination with Eritrea and it became common goals and the relations between them rose to the level of the alliance, especially since Eritrea is the only Arab country On the Red Sea in the middle of a continuous circle of Arab countries, the last of which was Djibouti, which joined the Arab League after its independence, and closed its ports to "Israeli" navigation. Therefore, it is in the interest of "Israel" to cooperate with Eritrea to create a fait accompli, especially since it is not organized into the Arab League so far. Therefore, it made it easier for it to use the islands located on its shores and at Bab al-Mandeb to deplete and threaten the Arab states, and work to turn the Red Sea into a region of turmoil to empower the United States of America and "Israel" while increasing its influence in the region.

Before Djibouti gained its independence, Israel worked to support its remaining under French rule as part of its efforts to thwart the Arab plans for the Red Sea, and to preoccupy the countries bordering it with their internal problems to keep them away from the conflict with it, on the pretext that independent Djibouti would join the Arab bloc, which would affect Israeli navigation. Especially on Bab al-Mandab Road(Khalil, 1988; Salem, 1993; Sultan, 1984).

Israel is trying to exploit the fluidity in the power relations between the countries of the Horn of Africa, and between these countries and the outside world, in order to have a role that has objective bases in the post-conflict arrangements and to shape the map of the Horn of Africa politically, especially in an important aspect of it, which is to re-fill the vacuum of emerging powers in the region. The Horn of Africa after the end of international polarization and the withdrawal of major political powers from the region.

The Israeli move in the Horn of Africa cannot be considered in any way separate from the Israeli strategy towards the Red Sea. Rather, it can be considered an integral and main part of this strategy, as Africa in general and the Horn of Africa in particular constitutes a major link in the framework of the strategy towards the Red Sea. The Horn of Africa is important to Israel due to its congruence with the Red Sea and its view of its southern window, and the dimensions of the "Israeli" movement in the region were governed by a clear strategy previously expressed by (David Ben-Gurion) when he said, "If we were able to control important sites in the Red Sea, we would be able to face the Arab siege wall, and even moving to trying to pounce on it.". This strategic argument emerges about the Red Sea in general and the Horn of Africa in particular, and it is based on the performance of its most important determinants on the awareness of the "Israeli" leaders from the beginning of its unstable geographical location and through geopolitical theories that focus on the importance of geographical locations and the need to control overlooking sites On the seas, and they were aware that "Israel" would be isolated, besieged and surrounded by a hostile environment, refusing to deal or coexist with it, and that it must secure outlets for it on the seas so that it would not be exposed to economic and political pressures as well as a number of factors, perhaps the most important of which are:

First: The strategic factor: It means having control over the passages and ports of the Red Sea, or at least preventing any hostile force from controlling these passages and ports, and (Ben Gorin) says (that Israel's control over points in the Red Sea will be of paramount importance because these points It will help "Israel" to evade any attempt to besiege and encircle it, and at the same time, it will form a military base for attacking our enemies in their own homes before they attack us).

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Second: The economic factor: For Israel, the Red Sea is a corridor for navigation towards East Africa and Asia. It also transports economic exports to and from abroad, especially oil, which is Israel's imports. According to these two factors, "Israel" has set its strategic goals in the Red Sea as follows(Abdullah, 1996; Al-Asbahi, 1996; M. T. Mahmoud, 1979; Salem, 1993; Sultan, 1984):

1. Control of the Red Sea outlets by "Israel".
2. Detection of Arab military activities in the Red Sea or on its shores.
3. Breaking any Arab siege imposed on "Israeli" ships and "Israeli" ports and passages in the Red Sea.
4. Securing communication and security in the Red Sea for the "Israeli" naval and civilian ships heading to the Mediterranean through Bab al-Mandeb and the Suez Canal to the Indian Ocean. Hence, the Red Sea, including the Horn of Africa, is of vital and strategic importance to Israel, and the latter has worked to achieve its strategy by controlling important areas to break Arab control over these sites with the help of the United States of America, through:

A - Supporting its armed forces in the Red Sea.
B - Increasing the settlement system in the Negev and north of the port of Eilat.
C- Establishing friendly, political, diplomatic and military ties with Ethiopia and the rest of the countries of the Horn of Africa.
D- Exploiting the islands of the Red Sea.

The Red Sea and the Horn of Africa are considered one of the most vital areas that the major powers have attached importance to because they control the sea lines of communication and oil supplies(Al-Ramadani, 1985; Kamel, 1996; Nouman, 1988). The Israeli role has become working in the Horn of Africa in two directions:

First: the escalation of the conflict in the Red Sea region and work on the internationalization of the Bab al-Mandab strait in particular, after its failure to end the Arab siege in 1973, and without the United States, the blockade would not have been lifted.

Before the war, Israel used to feel reassured as long as it controlled the Gulf of Aqaba, but it woke up after the 1973 war, when it found that the islands of Tirat and Sanafir, which dominate the Gulf, cannot ensure the continuation of navigation, because through the strategy of indirect approach, Israel can be exposed to the Red sea or the Arab shores that are exposed to it whether from Through the Bab al-

Mandab or from anywhere on the Arab coasts that control the Red Sea. The siege of Bab al-Mandab caused the refineries in Haifa and Ashdod to stop, and the Ethiopian line, Eilat Ashdod, to stop, and Israel's exports of citruses decreased 30% and 50% of the volume of its exports of cement and phosphates to its markets in East Africa and the Far East, accordingly, Israel benefited from the restrictions that The Arabs imposed it on its navigation in Bab al-Mandeb in 1971 and 1973, so it developed its naval and air forces until it was able to provide air cover for its ships at the strait. In fact, since 1976, Israeli planes have been flying over the area for reconnaissance and have penetrated the Yemeni airspace several times.

Second: Supporting its relations with Ethiopia in the past and Eritrea now, in order not to turn the Red Sea into an Arab sea and exploiting it to break the political and economic blockade that the Arab countries are trying to impose on it in Asia and Africa.

The title of the second axis

2. <u>The Red Sea in the Israeli realm</u>

"Israel" is working in order to be the regional superpower in the region, and in this strategy it is compatible with the strategy of the United States aimed at controlling the international shipping routes in the Red Sea, the Arabian Gulf and the Indian Ocean, and to achieve this, "Israel" worked to strengthen its relations with other countries. Located on the Red Sea, it has also developed a strategy to control the Red Sea based on underestimating the effectiveness of the Arab strategy to make the Red Sea an Arab lake. And "Israel" is working on implementing its strategy in stages that will enable it to secure "Israeli" navigation, and to establish its hegemony and supremacy in the region to expand its relations and trade with African and Asian countries and break the barrier of the Arab boycott. And Ben-Gurion had previously stated in 1955 that if the United Nations was not able to open the Straits of Tiran to Israeli shipping, then "Israel" would rely on itself to open this international corridor by force and threaten other Arab countries(Salem, 1993). Certainly, controlling the navigation routes in the Red Sea will enable it to control the passage of international trade. As well as petroleum and strategic raw materials. On the other hand, it will enable it to encircle Egypt in security in particular and the Arab presence in general. Therefore, "Israel" assumes a major role in Ethiopia and Eritrea, as Ethiopia was the first country to enter the circle of the security belt, in addition to other countries such as Uganda, Zaire, Kenya, Rwanda, Central Africa and Chad, and in the period 1961- 1963(Al-Asbahi, 1996; Shaarawy, 1984).

Although "Israel" occupies a narrow space in the Gulf of Aqaba, it considers the Red Sea a vital corridor from the security, military and commercial point of view. The state of war, to threaten southern Egypt, and "Israel" sought to confront the Arab strategy for fear of matching Arab interests by making the Red Sea an Arab lake, and therefore called for the Red Sea to be an international waterway. And this is not only in the interest of

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"Israel", Ethiopia and Eritrea, but it is in the interest of the states and the whole of the West("On 11/15/77, archives of the Center for Palestinian Studies,").

Israel realized early on the strategic importance of the Red Sea to the Arab countries, especially Bab al-Mandab, and that there would be no value for the Gulf of Eilat, the Sharm El-Sheikh region and the Straits of Tiran if a siege was imposed on Bab al-Mandab(Tadmur, 1987).

.It is worth noting that the "Israeli" strategy towards the Red Sea began to crystallize in 1949 after the establishment of the port of Eilat, and this strategy then sought to extend its influence on the Red Sea and confront the Arab strategy on the other hand, all in order to secure its freedom of navigation, which is directly related to security. The "Israeli" therefore called for the Red Sea to be an international waterway that should remain open to navigation and not be an Arab lake, or restrict the freedom of navigation of any country in it as the Arabs want, and therefore its fears of this possibility escalated in 1967 and 1973 when the Arabs actually closed the straits Tiran and Bab al-Mandab, and from this standpoint, "Israel" focused on Ethiopia, formerly and Eritrea now. Therefore, the latter has consistently pursued three main and intertwined patterns of action to achieve its control over the Red Sea: strengthening its armed forces, establishing strong relations with former Ethiopia and present-day Eritrea, and exploiting the islands of the Red Sea(Farhan, 1988; A. N. Mahmoud, 1979). Accordingly, the Red Sea has increased its importance as it is the main area that it traverses in its commercial and strategic relations with Asia and Africa.Oil is one of the main commodities imported by "Israel", even in 1979; "Israel" imported most of its oil from Iran. In order to secure its hegemony over the Red Sea, it worked, since the sinking of the destroyer Eilat by the Egyptian Navy on October 21, 1967, to develop a naval strategy that took the following directions:

1) Increasing the number of its naval boats and supplying them with Gabriel missiles. A fundamental change occurred in this field, for example, in the Maariv newspaper, "The experience of the Yom Kippur War showed that we must be ready to protect our ships from Sicily to the straits of Bab al-Mandab. This was imposed on Israel if it relied on fast attack boats with great efficiency on the Maneuvering and a multi-executive capacity instead of large ships and destroyers, which usually require large numbers of sailors in order to tighten control over the Bab al-Mandab Strait in order to provide control over what is happening in the Gulf of Suez to prevent surprises (from the Allied door) and the meaning of maritime control is to create a circle around The long "Israeli" border and the neutralization of the Suez Canal and its transformation from a major waterway for the passage of ships into a passage considered secondary to the military importance.
2) Relying on the "Israeli" industry to produce the required marine equipment.
3) Obtaining submarines from Britain that fit Israel's combat capabilities and its future war operations.
4) Development of the frog's system
5) Providing its naval forces with various types of private aircraft for reconnaissance, air coverage, attacking targets, or rescuing the navy during an attack on them.

The first test of the "Israeli" navy came on June 11, 1971, when a naval boat at Bab al-Mandab fired at a tanker chartered by "Israel" that was flying the Liberian flag, and the "Israeli" boats on the Eritrean island of Halab responded immediately. In the wake of this incident, Haim Bar-Lev, then-Israeli Chief of Staff, made a secret visit to Ethiopia in September 1971, where he offered to provide Ethiopia with radar stations on the Eritrean coast to monitor the smuggling of weapons from (Democratic Yemen) to the former Eritrean rebels, and to supply Ethiopia with various weapons that he supervises. "Israelis" until the Ethiopians complete their training. He visited Asmara, Massawa, and the "Israeli" base in Halib. This incident led to an intensification of Israeli activities in the southern part of the Red Sea, especially in the Eritrean islands. Therefore, it occupied some small scattered islands with a strategic location in the southern part of the Red Sea, either directly or by lending and leasing from Ethiopia, or through cooperation and coordination between them and the Ethiopia and the United States Among the islands where "Israel" has a presence: Haleeb, Dahlak, Hanish al-Kubra, Hanish al-Sughra, which belongs to Eritrea, as well as the islands of Daqr and Abu Ali, which originate in Yemen.The presence of "Israel" on the last two islands enabled its intelligence activities to extend and spying to Yemen(Sultan, 1984).

As a result of Ethiopia's severing of its political relations with "Israel" in 1973, "Israeli" activities in the Red Sea islands were reduced. In order for "Israel" to regain its influence, it supported the Mangistu regime in 1977, but these relations soon deteriorated in February 1978 following Yemen and Somalia's criticism of Ethiopia in this regard. The immediate reaction was the United States warning "Israel" of the result of this behavior, in addition to Egypt sending some destroyers to the region to face any emergency situation(Sultan, 1984).

It is noteworthy that as a result of the 1973 war experience and the siege of Bab al-Mandab, "Israel" began since 1974 to raise the issue of internationalizing or neutralizing the Bab al-Mandab Strait and the islands it controls, including the islands of Perim, Hanish, Qumran, Dhakr and Abu Ali. To be a major force to be reckoned with in the Red Sea and in the surrounding areas.

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General "Reserves" Aharon Yariv, head of the Centre for Strategic Studies at Tel Aviv University, wrote an article in the Maariv newspaper issued on September 22, 1978 saying, "In terms of general strategy, it can be said that in the Egyptian southern front, where we made the largest concessions in the territory, both in terms of sovereignty Or in terms of the military presence, our situation with this is still sound, because of the relatively large distance between the main concentration of the Egyptian forces, which are generally located in the area between the Suez Canal and the Delta, and between the vital areas in "Israel"(Jaradat, 1986).

As a real major power, it was disturbed by the Arab proposals on the Red Sea issue in 1977, and its loss of Iranian oil, and then the "peace treaty with Egypt in 1979" led to a modification of its policy in the Red Sea, and that Article 5 of it stipulated the following: "The two parties consider The Straits of Tiran and the Gulf of Aqaba are international waterways that are open to all states without hindrance or suspension of freedom of navigation or air transit. It does not establish a system that extends to other than its parties, but merely sets the principle accepted by Egypt and "Israel" with regard to their bilateral relations (1).

The lack of oil came to reduce the importance of the "Israeli" oil pipelines extending from Eilat to its ports on the Mediterranean, even though this factor did not diminish the value of the Red Sea as a sea route (2). The Egyptian-Israeli treaty came to recognize Israel's freedom of navigation in other waterways, including the Suez Canal, provided that Israel's freedom of passage in the Suez Canal somewhat reduced the economic importance of the Eilat port. Nevertheless, Israel revealed its military presence in The Gulf of Aqaba and the Red Sea and deployed many speedboats of the type (Israeli-made Wasp) and (Rashef) boats equipped with Gabriel missiles, backed by its air forces from the Negev airports, where America built "for Israel" there are two air bases(Howaidi, 1987; Kharbush, 1998).

Through strategic thinking in the Red Sea, "Israel" seeks to find an alternative to the Suez Canal, as "Israel" is trying to build a railway between the port of Eilat on the Gulf of Aqaba and the port of Ashkelon on the Mediterranean(Al-Hiti, 1984). It is worth noting that after the Camp David agreement and based on the oil supplement, "Israel" secured its oil needs from Egypt, as it imports all its needs from it, and thus secured oil whose transportation lines could not be threatened, and it transformed the Eilat region into a free port. The Egyptian "Israeli" treaty that was signed On March 26, 1979, it created "Israel" a suitable environment for its stability on the shores of the Red Sea, strengthened its military presence there, granted it the right of navigation in the Suez Canal, removed all threats to "Israel" and restricted the Egyptian strategy in this regard. Thus, "Israel" became free to tamper with as it wanted. In the Red Sea and in the region, this matter thus contributed to the removal of the Arab strategy of making the Red Sea an Arab lake, and these results emerged clearly through the American - "Israeli" strategic agreement. From here it can be said that the Egyptian "Israeli" treaty is a gain for Israel If we exclude the results of the first Gulf War, which resulted in important results regarding the "Israeli" strategy in this aspect, they can be summarized as follows(Al-Zoubi, 1986):-

1) The important sites in the Red Sea and the eastern coast of Sinai have been placed under the supervision of the multinational forces. These sites have come under American hegemony to provide the requirements of "Israeli" security and to ensure its navigation in the Red Sea, especially since these sites are devoid of the presence of Egyptian forces.

2) The "Israeli" naval presence, despite the shrinking of the maritime borders in which it was moving in a state of density and growth, the "Israeli" naval force: roams the Red Sea and reaches the Gulf of Suez without hindrances, and more than that, "Zionist" naval vessels were anchored in the sea The Mediterranean moved to it through the Suez Canal, noting that the Israeli naval vessels, when passing through the canal, are treated as friendly and allied countries.

3) The "Camp David" agreements and the peace treaty provided the opportunity for the United States of America to strengthen its naval presence in the region under various claims, including monitoring the commitment of the two parties to the Camp David agreements. It is no secret that this has helped establish US "Israeli" coordination aimed at subjecting the Red Sea and the region to joint US "Israeli" control. The first Gulf War proved this conclusion and became the reality of harmony, harmony and coordination between the American strategy and the "Israeli" strategy, and their perceptions of what the region should be. On the other hand, the United States of America obtained facilities in Egypt in "Ras Banas" as well as the joint exercises known as the "Bright Star" manoeuvres. Thus, America was able to secure the freedom of maritime passage for the commercial and military fleets of "Israel" and to maintain Egypt's neutrality in the conflict. As a result, "Israel" began to increase its strength, especially in the field of its naval power, and to strengthen its presence, and this mobilization began to grow after 1984 through many means, including(Al-Zoubi, 1986):

1. Continuing to strengthen the "Israeli" military presence through massive naval and air mobilization in the Gulf of Aqaba and the Red Sea, conducting sea and air patrols that extended to the southern entrances to the Red Sea, sending reconnaissance planes to fly over Yemen and threatening to attack targets in Yemen and Sudan.

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2. Building a network of military force in the Eilat area, road networks, and warehouses in order to use them as launching pads for military missions against the Arab countries to prevent them from participating in any combat effort against "Israel".

3. Increasing strategic interest in the Bab al-Mandab area, which is of great importance, and this interest has extended to include the Indian Ocean because of what is related to the "Israeli" maritime traffic.
4. Emphasis on the obligation to abide by the Egyptian "Israeli" peace treaty with regard to Israel's role in the region. It is worth noting that "Israel" seeks to give legitimacy to Zionist ambitions, especially in the Red Sea region, and to blackmail Arab countries hostile to this agreement.
5. Work to create an “Israeli” fait accompli by maximizing the military presence in the Red Sea, especially in the Arab region in general and this will certainly not be until after the collapse of Arab power, especially those that pose a direct threat to “Israel.”

From this standpoint, the war was launched on Iraq and threatened other countries such as Algeria and Libya, and “Israel” seeks to encourage conflict between the Arab countries, each other, which leads to instability in the region and thus becomes the spoiler(Bakri, 1991; Muhammad, 1993). The Red Sea has occupied a special strategic and security importance after the end of the war. The Cold War, in which the colonialist "Israeli" and American ambitions crystallized in the Red Sea, as the era that preceded that, the activities of these countries were indicators and attempts for an existence that became a realistic and studied reality. It became clear to all of these countries what they want from this geographical location.

The American and Israeli hegemony began to change the balance of power for these other parties, which led to the imbalance of regional powers in the Red Sea and in Africa. The intensity of conflicts within the continent eased and many issues were resolved in favour of Western goals and interests, and things became tense in the Horn of Africa. The Red Sea derives its strategic value from its central location in the heart of the Middle East, which is of great strategic importance mainly and from the economic resources of the countries bordering it. Since this site is located in the heart of the inhabited world and at the centre of the Middle East region and adjacent to both the Arabian Gulf and the Horn of Africa, this site has given a strategic dimension, as the eyes of the world look to that sensitive area. At the same time, the Red Sea gained its military importance from its location and then from its bases The task is due to its nature as a semi-closed sea and the length of its coasts that control this shipping lane, in addition to the fact that the sea is the main route for the warships of the United States and Israel coming from the Mediterranean to the Indian Ocean (Halim, 1997; Qandil, 1992). Israel aims to have the Arab countries participate in controlling the southern entrance to the Red Sea. Therefore, it has taken positive steps in making Eritrea its ally at the southern entrance to the Red Sea. Israel also seeks to push the Falasha Jews of Ethiopia to be present on some islands and to train them militarily so that they can control these islands in the future to achieve a strategic balance with the aim of thwarting any attempt to attack the southern entrance to the Red Sea. Israel is trying to increase its presence and work with Ethiopia and Eritrea to help the United States, especially after it had monopoly control over the Red Sea and the Indian Ocean during and after the Atlantic aggression against Iraq in 1991 and the resulting US occupation and invasion in 2003(Al-Marhoon, 2006).

The overall final developments of the Atlantic aggression against Iraq in 1991 and the resulting occupation and invasion in March 2003 in the Arab region, particularly around the Red Sea And Bab al-Mandab, which resulted in reducing the risks that threaten “Israeli” interests, as the agreement between Egypt and Israel and the intervention of the international community in the Atlantic aggression against Iraq, which resulted in the year 2003 of an increase in the American and Western naval presence in the Arab Gulf region and in the Red Sea, and the imposition of American control over the important straits in the region, and if we add to this the military cooperation agreements between some Arab countries bordering the Persian Gulf, between the United States, Britain and France, all of this put the Red Sea in a secondary position in relation to the burning areas of conflict, and this enables “Israel to work quietly and ambiguously to establish its feet in the east Africa and Europe, as well as its interests in Africa, the continuing displacement of Falasha Jews, the dispatch of experts and the sale of arms. When it was used as a main shipping line for the flow of petroc from Iran(Al-Aghbari, 1998; Farhan, 1988; Halim, 1997; A. N. Mahmoud, 1979; Shaarawy, 1984). On the contrary, Israel is taking advantage of the American and Western naval presence in the Gulf the Arab and Southern Red Sea researchers in increasing the realization of its economic and military interests and objectives in the region. Professor Behzkel Duror, who is one of the senior researchers of strategic affairs in Israel, identifies the objectives of this strategy as follows:

1. The transformation of Israel into a regional state, rather the most powerful country in the region in the nineties and first decade of the next century, which led to the practice of a grand strategy that affects the formation of the political, social and strategic conditions in the region and influences the course of events in it that is compatible with the interests of this strategy.
2. Working to break up the Arab powers through an Arab dismantling of the existing relations between the groups that constitute the grips of the Arab countries and spreading sectarian and ethnic differences.

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3. The transformation of "Israel" into the United States of the Middle East to be the centre of "Israel" in the region, similar to the United States of America in Latin America.
4. The strategic alliance between “Israel and the United States has led to the emergence of military coordination between the two sides to reach the rank of a strategic meeting, and this has resulted in the placement of land, sea and air bases at the disposal of the United States for use in joint action to confront any unpleasant developments that may occur in the region, which is what it actually happened with the aggression and the Atlantic occupation of Iraq in 1991 and 2003, and the United States agreed to the request made by “Israel” to expand its territorial waters in the seas overlooking it to a distance of 12 miles(Al-Marhoon, 2006; Halim, 1997; Qandil, 1992). The researcher believes that the Arab countries should develop a military strategy to confront expansionist ambitions and “Israeli” dangers to achieve joint coordination between them in order to achieve their security in the face of this threat in the future, and “Israel” represents the main threat to Arab national security and the security of the Red Sea, where it can be said that Israel has a pivotal role in making regional and international sources of threat, if not in all of them.

In light of the collapse of the former Soviet Union and the Atlantic aggression against Iraq, the "Israeli" leadership realized the decrease in the threat to "Israeli" security in light of the above facts. However, they believe that "Israel" must continue to maintain military superiority in terms of quality and the size of the military forces that would enable it to defeat any Arab country or any Arab alliance directed against it in the future.

Based on the developments of the occupation of Iraq, and as a result of the settlement agreements, the Red Sea is not considered at the present time a purely Arab lake for the following reasons:

First: In the Northernmost part of the Red Sea, "Israel" overlooks the Gulf of Aqaba.

Second: The Arab efforts were squandered by the ability to transform the Red Sea into an Arab navy, after Eritrea's independence in 1993, its adoption of anti-Arab policies and its enjoyment of distinguished relations with both "Israel" and Ethiopia.

Third: The independent Eritrea has a view of the Red Sea, estimated at (1080) km(Abu-Bakr, 1994; Sabi, 1983). On the coast of the Red Sea, and that its independence led to more threats to the security of the Red Sea from the point of view of the Arabs and Arab national security in general. It is good with the alliance among them, while Arab relations are characterized by deterioration, and Arab thinkers unanimously consider “Israel” as one of the sources of threat to Arab national security, if not the most important at all, and “Israel” represents, in addition to the former Ethiopia and Eritrea, one of the non-Arab parties.

They overlook the shore of the Red Sea, which would impede any serious attempt to maintain the security of the Red Sea from an Arab point of view, as the Arab-Israeli conflict has always been closely linked to the Red Sea. In other words, the Red Sea has always played a very important role in the development of the Arab-Israeli conflict, and Israel has been keen for its ships to enjoy the right of passage through the Gulf of Aqaba.The status of the Israeli air force, (technological) progress in the field of conventional weapons and the role of Israeli military intelligence. The Israeli security theory focuses on the following three main pillars:

1. Military superiority over the surrounding Arab armies combined.
2. Gaining regional legitimacy through Israel's imposition of its presence in the region by talking about a Middle Eastern system as an alternative to the Arab system.
3. Controlling the region by working to protect the existing situation and considering any change in it as a threat to Israel's national security. And "Israel" is trying to create friendly relations with the countries surrounding the region, such as (Turkey - Ethiopia - Eritrea). It also tries to address the minorities in the Arab world, such as the Druze, the Maronites, the Kurds and the Copts(Al-Aghbari, 1998; Al-Baghdadi, 2000; Kharbush, 1998).
4. The geopolitical map of the Red Sea has changed and the Red Sea has not turned into an Arab lake as it was prevalent in some perceptions, as the US and French naval forces deployed in its waters and on its shores with unprecedented sizes, and were stationed there permanently since the beginning of the Atlantic aggression against Iraq in 1991. The geophysical map of it has also changed, due to the increasing flow of oil into its waters through the Saudi, Yemeni, Iraqi (interrupted), Egyptian and then Sudanese pipelines. Thus the Red Sea has become an (international lake) linked to global interests, and it is difficult to influence those who roam the countries bordering it(Al-Aghbari, 1998; Al-Baghdadi, 2000; Ghalioun, 1991; Kharbush, 1998; Odeh, 1997).
5.

Conclusions

The nineties were shaped by the escalation of the direct American role in practicing the formula of the Middle Eastern system on the ground, and that the Horn of Africa, with its distance from the nature of the Arab-Israeli conflict, was dealing with Israel as a country with interests within the framework of the region, and this change also coincided With the transition of the reality of international relations to a new stage in which the

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American hegemony emerged on the surface, and it was searching for new forms within the frameworks of political systems. Meanwhile, the pace of the Israeli movement accelerated and began to be very interested in what is happening in the Red Sea basin, especially its Southern location controlling the Bab al-Mandab Strait and overlooking the most important islands distinguished by height and strategic locations on the Southern port, which constitutes for Israel an extension of its maritime security cycles, but it has become evident within the pace of changes. This is for the (Israeli) accounts to have broader aspirations, especially as it is a sophisticated military force and a tight network of capable intelligence services that can use all their qualifications to advance their interests here or there. The "Israeli" strategy has at this time possessed many concerns, which is anticipating the extent of the cracks resulting from the absence of the influence of international powers, the most severe of which was during the Cold War between the two international poles, the United States of America and the collapsed Soviet Union, and in this context, Israel began to move to fill the power vacuum. And it seeks to consolidate its vital presence between the folds of that region and at its heart as well. The political events and the major twists and turns that Eritrea and Ethiopia witnessed at the beginning of the nineties had a special taste (for Israel).

The Israeli activity in the south of the Red Sea, close to the sources of the Nile in Ethiopia, naturally entails a broader and broader scheme aimed at achieving political and military goals, foremost of which are the following conclusions:

1. Securing Israel's maritime depth and exiting from the limited Eilat port to spaces commensurate with the Israeli mentality in imposing its influence on the Red Sea. In return, Israel aims mainly to turn the balance of naval military power in its favour in the face of the Arab threat.
2. Controlling the Red Sea coast and the islands overlooking it in Eritrea is a strategic encirclement for the security of the Arab economy, which is directly affected by the waters of the Nile and its need to pass through the Red Sea, in addition to the fact that Arab oil as a vital material in the current stages depends in its passing on the Red Sea, which it describes Some observers claim that it has become an oil pipeline.
3. Israel's conquest of the southern Red Sea constitutes a breaking of the chokehold that threatened it when it clashed with the Arab power, and that any way to use the sea to pressure Israel, as happened in 1973, is now excluded in light of the current situation.

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