

A CRITICAL EVALUATION OF HINDUTVA PINNED THROUGH ECONOMIC LIBERALIZATION: THE MARKETIZATION OF HINDU NATIONALISM

Kanishk Kant Misra,

Research Scholar, Department of History, kanishk.misra26@gmail.com, School of Humanities, Languages and Social Science, ShriVenkateshwara University, Rajabpur, NH-24, Venkateshwara Nagar, Gajraula, Uttar Pradesh 244236

***Dr. Deepak Singh,**

Assistant Professor, PhD (History), Department of History, School of Humanities, Languages and Social Science, ShriVenkateshwara University, Rajabpur, NH-24, Venkateshwara Nagar, Gajraula, Uttar Pradesh 244236

**Corresponding Author: Dr. Deepak Singh*

ABSTRACT

Some people believe that radical political parties' embracing of markets and globalisation reflects and allows for the taming of their views. This piece of article takes a look at Hindutva (Hindu nationalism) in India. It is proposed that, in order to advance the Hindutva objective, Hindutva supporters should absorb and adopt contemporary economic notions rather than trying to restrain Hindu nationalism. Since the state was seen like the guardian of the Hindu society in counter to the markets and a means for societal conversion for its Hindu nationalists as a back until the 1990s. The Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP), formerly, the Jana Sangh, has its origins in the mainstream ideas of the Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh (RSS). Indian bureaucratic and political elites, particularly those connected to the BJP, have viewed the market as the primary driver of societal changes since the 1990s. By supporting business and rebranding the middle and neo-middle classes as virtuous market citizens, who considers themselves as consumers and entrepreneurs but whose behaviour is influenced by Hindu nationalism. The BJP has aimed to increase its number of supporters to spur economic growth as well as to create jobs. These opinions are controversial, nevertheless, both in the Hindu nationalist movement and throughout Indian culture. The efforts of BJP to address these issues include the recent expansion of the anti-nationalism debate as well as the usage of legitimate sanctions to counter dissent.

Key Words: *Radical policies, Hindutva, global markets, societal transformation and neo-middle class.*

1. INTRODUCTION

The "Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh" ("National Volunteers Association") and the "Vishwa Hindu Parishad" ("World Hindu Council") are both constituents of the Hindu nationalist movement, which is represented politically by the BJP (VHP). Its Hindutva philosophy is based on the idea that a certain interpretation of Hinduism and Hindu culture should define Indian nationhood, with the Muslim community and other minorities being absorbed into this majoritarian national identity. Critics, however, praised the BJP and its candidate for the post of prime minister, Narendra Modi, during the 2014 election campaign for steering clear of nationalist sloganeering and putting more of an emphasis on promises of economic progress and prosperity. For example, Ashutosh Varshney claimed that Modi's campaign had been devoid of anti-Muslim language. Instead, he has concentrated on development and governance. Varshney cited decades of political science studies contending that "no left-wing or right-wing party can win power in Delhi without leaning toward the centre," noting that Modi's departure from pure "Hindu nationalism" is coherent with this claim. Varshney was elaborating on the institutional concepts of moderation, which hold that democratic electoral politics moderate political parties and ideology. Despite this, Varshney came to the conclusion that "today, the cultural revolution of India is the principal purpose of BJP's politics" merely two years after the election.

According to this, institutional theories of moderation are flawed, as demonstrated by the BJP's success in India. According to Ruparelia and Jaffrelot, the BJP has alternated in times of apparent moderation as well as times of division as it has required to restructure institutions and public discussions by "moving the centre of gravity to the right." Nonetheless, theories of moderation believe that as political parties join a pluralistic party system, their views will become more moderate. This suggests that participating in electoral politics has not led to a significant ideological change.

Investigation of the notion that BJP's acceptance of free and liberal market system is the proof that the theory of moderation is at work universally. For instance, Baldev Raj Nayar asserts that the BJP's change to a moderate economic strategy is primarily motivated by the "centrist inclination created by India's democratic system." India's centrist political tendencies are expressed by its acceptance of economic liberalisation in an age of economic globalisation.

The BJP, on the other hand, has embraced markets alongside its majoritarian doctrine rather than in opposition to it. In addition, this piece of writing claim that this has historically been a characteristic of Hindu nationalism in that, despite frequently absorbing popular economic theories, it has sought to reframe these concepts in order to benefit its support

base. Hindu nationalism's ideological ambiguity on economic and social policy made this policy flexibility conceivable, and it was required by "Hindu nationalist political parties" desire to widen their support and come to the centre power.

Examining Hindu nationalist notions regarding the correct interactions between the society, state and market in two different period of times is necessary to bolster these claims. The article's first portion covers the years 1947 to the late 1990s and argues that although while Hindu nationalism stressed the priority of society over its people and the state, and the state was still crucial as a defence against the market and an instrument for societal change. The importance on Hindu society and the defence of organisations that support Hindu nationalism set this perspective on the state apart from that of the leading political party at the time, the Indian National Congress (INC).

This change was influenced by a specific domestic political and socioeconomic perspective, then again it reflects a change in what Iqtidar refers to as the global political imagination, as shown by the prominence of market like a tool for mobilising political projects in both elite and prevalent political discourse worldwide. Following that, the RSS and the BJP split the Hindu nationalist movement on economic and social policies, with the latter emphasising the role of the state like a defender of specific associations in society that serve to its' favour. The present coalition government's policies, which is led by the BJP, have increased the rift between the BJP and the RSS. In contrast to earlier "Hindu nationalist" tactics, BJP has worked to back business interests and rebuild the middle and neo-middle classes as market citizens, who see themselves as consumers and business people and have come to view the market, not the government, as the engine of economic expansion and job creation.

In the 1980s, local governments and civil society organisations took over the responsibility for providing social services, putting more of an emphasis on technocratic policy management for choice, efficiency, and market based economic inclusion rather on representative political practise or the creation of a constitutional and political consensus. The market citizen of the BJP, on the other hand, stands out because it differs from the self-governing independent person represented in many neoliberal ideas.

An autonomous, independent, and self-disciplined person, the active entrepreneurial citizen "does not make claims on the state and is prepared to take responsibility for his or her own well-being and for managing risks and vulnerabilities arising from socio-economic or political sources," according to Gooptu's summary. As a result, in the next section of this writing, the individual is described as a commercial consumer whose way of dealing is structured by the cultural frame of "Hindu majoritarianism" and motivated by a desire to strengthen the Hindu nation. Hence, "virtuous market citizenship" is a distinct synonym.

The blending of cultural nationalism and neoliberalism in BJP's righteous market nationality is an Indian indication of a rising worldwide tendency, even though the compatibility of the two ideologies has long been noted. For instance, Stuart Hall emphasised the importance of "English nationalism" and moral panic over law and order, and race in the 1980s in calming public worries and winning support for neo-liberalization in the UK. Numerous private and public actors have involved with both cultural nationalism and neoliberal practises concurrently as neoliberalism has spread over the world, changing both. Iqtidar claims that starting in the late 1990s, Pakistan's largest political Islamist party, Jamaat-e-Islami, began putting more of an emphasis on interacting with society in the marketplace as opposed to the government, for instance through assisting with microenterprises and skill development. Widger has shown how the private sector's philanthro-capitalism in Sri Lanka reflects and influences the nation's dominant Sinhala Buddhist narratives.

Although Gopalakrishnan and Desai and others have shown links between "Hindu nationalism" and "neoliberalism" in the Indian context, further research is required to thoroughly understand the particular configurations of society-state-market interactions that neo-liberalization methods are generating. In addition, as noted in the article's conclusion, the Hindu nationalist movement and the Indian society at large are still engaged in a heated dispute over worthy market citizenship and neo-liberalization in general. The BJP is currently working to marginalise dissent and better blend neoliberal and Hindu nationalism processes by cultivating an anti-nationalist narrative.

1. SIGNIFICANCE OF THE STUDY

On a platform of sound economic management and increasing job creation, Narendra Modi won the 2014 election. By eliminating obstacles to development and job formation, Modi's campaign slogan of "maximum governance, least government" stoked expectations that he would totally convert India's economy. An evaluation of the economic policies of Modi government from 2014 to 2019, with a focus on notable measures including demonetization, bankruptcy reform, GST changes, and Make in India, also known as "Vocal for Local." We contend that the primary goal of Modi's economic initiatives should be to increase political support and secure the BJP's hold on power for the ensuing ten years. Inadvertently triggering institutional reforms like decision-making centralization and political information management, Modi's success in establishing himself as a decisive leader also directed to policies that were unsuccessful to deal with, and in various cases made matters worse, the nation's economic issues.

2. REVIEW OF RELATED STUDIES

Gentt, Sinha and Wyatt (2021) have explained that as the Narendra Modi was elected in 2014 on a platform of sound economic management and new jobs. Modi's campaign pledge of "maximum governance, minimum government" sparked expectations that he might overhaul Indian economy through eliminating roadblocks to development besides employment formation. From 2014 to 2019, we evaluate the Modi government's economic policies, concentrating on key measures such as bankruptcy reform, demonetization, GST reforms, and Make in India. We suggest that economic policies of Modi should be viewed primarily as a political scheme aimed at increasing political support as well as ensuring

the control of BJP in the upcoming times. Furthermore, we demonstrate that Modi's triumph in establishing himself as a strong leader inadvertently activated institutional changes like centralization, decision-making, and political information management, which weakened Indian capability and led to strategies that botched to deal with, and in various cases aggravated, the country's economic difficulties.

Chacko (2019) has analysed that radical political parties' embrace of markets and globalisation is frequently interpreted as reflecting and enabling the moderation of their ideas. The case of "Hindu nationalism," or "Hindutva," in India is examined in this article. It is suggested that, rather than causing Hindu nationalism to moderate, contemporary economic principles are absorbed and adapted by Hindutva supporters to advance the Hindutva agenda. Since the state was seen as the protector of Hindu society against markets and a tool for structural transformation for its Hindu nationalist support base, the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP), its prior incarnation, the Jana Sangh, and the grass - root organisation, the Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh (RSS), adopted the mainstream ideas until the 1990s. Political elites and Indian bureaucrats, especially those in the BJP, have viewed the market as the primary source of societal alterations since the 1990s. Under the rule of Modi, BJP has specifically wanted to broaden its base of support, spur economic growth, and create jobs by supporting business interests and redefining the middle and neo-middle classes as virtuous market citizens, who consider themselves as businesspersons as well as consumers whose actions are governed by "Hindu nationalism." However, these ideas are divisive in the "Hindu nationalist movement" and the society of India as a whole. The BJP's attempt to address these difficulties is the recent rise of a discussion on "anti-nationalism" and the usage of legal consequences to counter dissent.

The elusive and paradoxical nature of Indian polity is best exemplified by **Guha's (2018)** explanation of the blend of Western principles of bureaucratic organisation, collaborative politics, and indigenous traditions as well as institutional framework that came directly on Indian soil. Even though the Westminster model of parliamentary government and representative legal institutions were adopted in post-colonial India, this did not imply an exact duplication of the British architectonic system of advanced industrial democracy. Rather, it indicated the adoption of democratic political ethos and structural architecture. The political process in India eventually took on a mass character and vibrancy, changing the parameters of political dominance and sowing the seeds of an independent India. This was made possible by the fervent participation of marginalised groups and unprivileged political formations as well as social groups in the political arena, along with the regionalization of the polity.

3. OBJECTIVES

The research study has been aimed to accomplish the following objectives:

- a. To assess the historical establishment of a socially equal and responsible society as underpinned by Bhartiya Janta Party aka Bhartiya Jana Sangha.
- b. To analyze the concept of 'swadeshi liberalization' established post 2014.
- c. To review the marketization of Hindutva.

4. RESEARCH METHODOLOGY

This piece of writing has used the qualitative research method which is descriptive and analytical in nature.

5. ANALYTICAL DISCUSSION

5.1 A SOCIALLY EQUAL AND RESPONSIBLE SOCIETY

M.S. Golwalkar, V.D. Savarkar, and Deendayal Upadhyaya all made significant contributions to the expansion of "Hindu nationalism" as a distinct intellectual and political movement beginning in the 1920s. Contrarily, "Hindu nationalism" has been more concerned with questions of identity of Hindu than it has been with social and economic upheaval. Hindutva, a foundational work of Hindu nationalism written by Savarkar in the year 1923. Savarkar was a nationalist who went on to run the political party named, "Hindu Mahasabha" (Hindu Grand Assembly) which was concentrated on describing an ethnic Hindu identity, separating an insecure Hindu mass population from a dangerous Muslim community, and encouraging Hindu unity and aggressive resistance to risks as the road to greatness. However, it didn't provide any insight into the political, economic, or social beliefs of Hindu nationalism. However, some of the speeches of Savarkar from the 1930s to 1940s concentrated more on social and economic concerns, his views were more significantly influenced by the anti-colonial nationalism context, the Congress's definition of which Savarkar embraced, the want to portray the Hindu Mahasabha as a political adversary, as well as the goals of the Hindu Mahasabha. For instance, he claimed in a 1939 lecture that given the circumstances in India, "the only school of economics that will suit our requirements in the immediate future is the school of Nationalistic economy." It required extensive national industrialization and the creation of pleasant existences for farmers and labourers in order to give workforces for the national army that would safeguard "wealth and health" of India. Additionally, it called for defence against foreign rivalry and the 'need of the Nation as a whole' to take precedence above both capitalist and labour interests. While private property must be protected inviolate in general, this meant that nationalising corporations, collecting and vivifying lands, and using force to quell labour unrest were all possibilities.

The majority of these proclamations' text does not considerably diverge from the viewpoints that were being advocated at the time inside Congress. As a component of creating a nationalist political economy, thinkers like Gopal Krishna Gokhale, Dadabhai Naoroji, and Mahadev Govind Ranade wrote about topics including state involvement, assets

redistribution, industrialization, self-reliance, and economic protectionism. These men, many of whom were profoundly inspired by Frederick's "national developmentalism," went on to become influential members of Congress and were fierce opponents of both the colonial and classical economies. Significantly, Savarkar expressed these notions in forms of organicist and militant nationalism, such as to support his Hindu nationalist identity politics, a strategy that would later come to characterise Hindu nationalist socio-economic policies, he emphasised factors like intolerance for dissent and the need for a strong army.

In contrast to Upadhyaya, who developed many of Savarkar's and Golwalkar's ideas into a simplistic corporatist social and political system, M.S. Golwalkar, the RSS's leader from 1940 to 1973, is credited with more thoroughly connecting "Savarkar's conceptions of Hindutva, Hindu nation, and Hindu war with...a political sociology of the nation state, democracy, rights, citizenship, and minorities." The RSS, which was established in 1925, took pride in being a "non-political" group devoted to sociocultural advancement.

As a result, the "Hindu nation," which Golwalkar considered to be cultural, was to be the RSS's area of operation. The state, which was considered to be political, was moulded and subordinated by the state. Golwalkar opposed the RSS becoming a political force, but he permitted RSS members to participate in the doings of the Bharatiya Jana Sangh (Indian People's Association), a political group established in 1951 for filling the hole left by the dissolution of "Hindu Mahasabha" of Savarkar in 1940s. Pt. Upadhyaya served as Jana Sangh's general secretary and belonged to the RSS. His "integral humanism" concept impacted the Jana Sangh and the RSS starting in 1965, and it continues to serve as the BJP's founding principle. Jana Sangh's nationalism and Upadhyaya was stated in milder language emphasising the safeguarding of the "Hindu spirit," whereas Golwalkar's Hindu nationalism was clearly racist and focused on the "Hindu soul" while singling out Christians, Communist, and Muslim communities as threats to the nation.

However, Upadhyaya shared Golwalkar's criticism of capitalism for emphasising materialism. He also criticised the notion of a social contract for prioritizing people over society and the wellbeing to the state for giving the government an excessive amount of power. Contrary to this, Upadhyaya claimed for a perspective on society as a whole social organism, with the state acting as the soul guardian by maintaining dharma, that according to him is law. In contrast to Golwalkar, Upadhyaya believed that the state was accountable for delivering basic public goods despite opposing the notion of an all-powerful state because it causes a collapse of Dharma and societal corruption. The state's role was to protect and unite society by controlling markets and offering essential public goods like education and health. This agenda was similar to that of the Congress government, but in keeping with "Hindu nationalist society" was paralleled to the "Hindunation".

In order to implement social programmes, counter Communist trade union influence, and neutralise the risk of class conflict, which it believed might split Hindu society, the RSS formed trade associations in the 1950s. For the RSS, the purpose of trade unions was to unite employees and employers in a setting akin to a family where differences could be settled within a structure of moral principles for the benefit of the whole society or country.

The interventionist food policy of the Congress government, which featured a Public Distribution System (PDS) to supply consumers sponsored food grains and give farmers minimum supporting prices (MSP), was also accepted by the Jana Sangh.

The Jana Sangh continued to support important Hindu nationalist objectives including declaring Hindi the official language of India and eliminating Jammu and Kashmir's special status from the Constitution of India, overshadowing its focus on socioeconomic issues in 1950s. As a result, it had a smaller audience outside of northern India, where these issues were less pressing. The balance of power inside the party swung in support of the RSS and Upadhyaya in 1953 after the passing of Syama Prasad Mukherjee, a non-Jana Sangh and RSS leader. Former Congressman Mukherjee viewed to alter the ideologies of Jana Sangh in order to win over traditional Hindus who disapproved of Nehru's interventionist economic policies and stress on "secularism" as well as former Congress followers who supported a free market economy. As a result, the Jana Sangh would grow more protective, territorial, and open to the viewpoints of the lower middle classes in the northern cities and towns.

The two ideas that inspired the economic policy of Upadhyaya- decentralization, swadeshi or self-reliance- were taken from non-Hindu nationalist socioeconomic theory related to Gandhi and the other thinkers already mentioned. Swadeshi and decentralisation were used by the democratic socialist agenda of the Nehruvian state to promote democracy by import-substituting industrialization and local political institutions. Swadeshi and decentralisation were used by Gandhi to promote economic, moral, and political empowerment for local communities. However, in Upadhyaya's works, they were meant to protect small-scale landowners and businesses in order to better the country/society. Upadhyaya advised the Jana Sangh to comprise the flow of populism presented by the then PM Indira Gandhi in order to stopher party's declining support and position herself as the protector of the "common man," including Atal Bihari Vajpayee, who succeeded Upadhyaya as the party president after his demise in 1968. The "Jana Sangh" launched a national war on poverty in 1971, emulating Indira Gandhi's call to abolish poverty with the help of programmes like land reform and low-interest lending for farmers.

5.2 SWADESHI LIBERALIZATION

Because of the dismal performance of BJP in the general elections of 1984, its economic and social policies were reevaluated, and the RSS made an effort to exercise more influence over the party. Beginning in the middle of the 1980s, the party's assessment of social and economic policies of Congress was strengthened in a return to fundamental problems of Hindu nationalist identity. The 1990s saw the Congress government enact liberal market economic reforms, which

were incredibly successful in boosting the BJP's electoral and membership supports. This approach included encouraging foreign investment in the technology sectors and membership and praising the government's economic deregulation. However, because of large part to severe stress from the BJP and RSS emphasised the necessity of ongoing state protection for farmers and consumer sectors. Because of their importance to employment and export income, small-scale industries were favoured in the economic policy of BJP. Additionally, the BJP waged campaigns in oppose to the government's reductions in farmer fertiliser subsidies, wheat imports, and India's debt to the International Monetary Fund (IMF). India borrowed from IMF in 1991 when the country was facing balance of payment crisis. In 1993 election campaign, BJP promoted decoupling of domestic liberalisation and globalisation, with the erstwhile requiring to happen before the later.

In 1992, the Ayodhya campaign came to an end. This campaign gained momentum during a period of extreme economic and social turmoil, giving rise to both happy and dissatisfied factions. Disgruntled lower-middle class youth from intermediate or caste backgrounds played a major role in the Ayodhya violence because they were afraid that a new national alliance government led by the Janta Dal in 1990 would implement reservation policies in education sector and employment creation that would favour groups together known in the country as the "Other Bahujans" (OBCs).

In its electoral programme from 1991, the BJP stated that "reserve policy should be used as an instrument of social justice and creating social unity" in contrast to their advocacy of economic criteria. Since the BJP's new upper middle class support base and the prior "Hindu nationalist" lower middle-class backing had different conceptions of society, state, and market relations, the swadeshi liberalisation agenda was fraught with difficulties. The latter were active in mobilising against government measures to open the market of India and restrict labour to global investment as well as competition during 1990s. In the 1990s, ideology associated with Hindu nationalism that promised safety, discipline, and a recognised, dangerous "Other" in religious minorities, notably Muslims, united these two bases of support. However, the tensions that had been hidden by these discourses surfaced when BJP-led merged government came to rule in 1998 after that in 2014. The transition from the state as a protector to the state as a facilitator, as well as the resistance the BJP has experienced, are discussed in the remaining sections of this essay.

The party must create an emotional link with those who belong to the impoverished, weaker, and oppressed parts of society by placing an importance on social justice and social peace. The Congress's goal of "inclusive development" was virtually unchanged in the 2009 election manifesto, which promised strong policies and focused action to fight poverty and superior execution of the landmark of Congress government, "National Food Security Act." After failing in two straight elections, BJP looked for afresh and distinct track in 2014 elections. A young, provincial leader, Modi, who possessed a solid RSS foundation but had created the BJP's hegemony in Gujarat specifically by the amalgamation of development and "Hindutva," which the debate of 2004, cleared the way for, was ultimately chosen to replace the senior national leadership. Since it was under Modi that Hindutva would definitively begin to marketize, with the state establishing itself like a provider of the emergence of a middle-class consumers and business people governed by Hindutva ideas.

5.3 MARKETIZATION OF HINDUTVA

Under Modi's leadership, the BJP made an effort to plea to the nation's neo-middle classes in the elections of 2014. According to the 2014 election programme, the term neo-middle class refers to those who have emerged from the category of poverty but have not yet stabilised in the middle-class. It continues, saying that this neo-middle class requires careful hand-holding. After gaining success in the 2014 elections, the Modi administration put in place a number of measures to achieve this objective. In order to move away from the Congress-led administration's right-based economic and social insertion for the poor and marginalised in support of neo-middle-class programmes, the government has changed its approach to social policy. By way of illustration, the BJP government has introduced the "Pradhan Mantri (Prime Minister's) Micro Units Development and Refinance Agency" (MUDRA) to restructure farmers' loans as well as the "MUDRA Bank," contrary to the earlier loan waiver programme of the Congress government, for struggling cultivators as part of its inclusive development strategy.

On the grounds that the government must trust its citizens, Upadhyay's "Shramev Jayate Karyakram," for instance, tried to increase the ease of pursuing business through removing labour limitations such as online self-reporting of compliance. The Communist Party of India (CPI) condemned the scheme for damaging the previous lax labour protection government, but the government hailed it as a pro-labor initiative as it provided workers the access to health insurance, traineeships, and skills training despite the fact that workers and trade unions were not being the part in the development of this scheme.

Other financial inclusion initiatives give undocumented employees access to banking and private insurance products funded by the government. The three programmes are the "Pradhan Mantri Suraksha Bima Yojana," which offers insurance against any accident, the "Pradhan Mantri Jan Dhan Yojana," which grants access to accounts in banks, and the "Pradhan Mantri Jeevan Jyoti Bima Yojana," which offers health assurance. Financialization has been a primary objective for the World Bank (WB) since the commencement of the global economic crisis in 2008, and it was also for the prior Congress-led administration.

This does not, however, imply that the ideology of Hindu nationalism has been marginalised. Instead, a closer investigation of economic as well as social policies of BJP government reveals a focus on the advancement of businessmen who, in contrast to the self-regulating independent people of neoliberal capitalist transformation discussions

in the West, are constrained by culturally defined Hindu nationalist social structures and whose objective is to increase the Hindu nation. The function of the state in this state-society-market interaction is to promote market citizenship and a Hindu majoritarian ethos in order to advance the “Hindu nation.” This is in accordance with the view of “Hindu nationalists” that society is more important than both the individual and the state. The outcome was that Modi described the purportedly pro-labor Pandit Deendayal Upadhyay’s Shramev Jayate Karyakram programme as an empathetic way that would culminate in the Shram Yogi (labourer) turning to be a Rashtra Yogi, and therefore a Rashtra Nirmaata (nation-builder).

With the help of a brand-new initiative called the “Pradhan Mantri Suraksha Bandhan Yojana,” which inspires its members to give gifts to their sisters this fixed deposits card so that it can be used in insurance schemes. The “Jan Dhan Yojana programme” has been encouraged to Hindu women by being linked to the Raksha Bandhan (bond of protection) festival, which honours the responsibility of brothers towards their sisters. For years, the RSS has emphasised and reinterpreted Raksha Bandhan in order to stir up nationalist sentiment. The country will be more prosperous the more economically active and empowered women there are in the population.



From the aforementioned graphical representation, it is clear that these policies have subjected to the conversation for the last 48 months, covering everything from corporate insolvency to financial inclusion, identification, and the battle against dark money. Some of these regulations are expansions of earlier concepts, such as “Aadhaar” or the “Goods and Services Tax (GST),” both of which are ongoing projects. Examples of unique ideas are demonetisation and the Insolvency & Bankruptcy Code. In certain circumstances, like the “GST,” the government gained support from the media, legislature, as well as the states. Some of them didn't, like demonetization. Similar to how Modi advanced “Aadhaar” and expanded the “MGNREGA,” these initiatives—one each in 2014, 2015, and 2017, and six in 2016—describe the array of economic thinking of the current government. Minor adjustments will remain now as the structural reform is over, in spite of the criticism that its realization, specifically, the significant compliance burden placed on small enterprises during its initial rollout, was pointless, ill-conceived, and bureaucratic.

6. CONCLUSION

This article has looked at the evolving views of “Hindu nationalism” on the government, markets, and society. It has been said that “Hindu nationalist parties” and organisations have drawn on widely held national and universal conceptions whereas redefining them in a manner that benefits their supporters as well as majoritarian ideology, rather than having independent opinions on economic and social policy. For the purpose of establishing market dominance, allocating resources towards its foundation of small farmers and businessmen, and advancing Hindu society. The concept was propagated by the Hindu nationalist movement from before independence to the late 1990s.

The Hindu Nationalist Political Party, BJP, has accepted the notion of the state as a provider for society's interaction with market since the late 1990s, while the RSS resumes to support for the protectionist and interventionist policies. According to trends in the universal political imagination, markets are gradually seen by the elite section of India, including the BJP members, as a source of public good and societal reform. The Hindu nationalist approach, on the other hand, is unique in that the policies of BJP, aims to generate a commercial consumer whose behaviour is governed by Hindu majoritarianism's cultural structure and is geared toward the advancement of the “Hindu nation,” as opposed to personifying a self-regulatory, independent market citizen. This suggests that the BJP's majoritarian ideology has not been moderated despite its rhetorical focus on governance and development at the moment. Instead, the BJP seeks to shift the intellectual centre of gravity in order to normalise and legitimise majoritarianism.

The article adds to the body of knowledge on the increasing fusion of neoliberalism and nationalism by asserting that the Hindutva movement is currently being marketized. As it is in other nations like Turkey where comparable state-led culturally ingrained neoliberalization processes are taking place, the BJP's market citizenship aims to strengthen its base of support and nationalist ideology while changing the state's role and its ties with both the market and society. However, as the Turkish example demonstrates, neoliberal projects are intrinsically feeble and divisive. Both in the Indian society and the Hindu Nationalist Movement, there is a heated dispute over virtuous market citizenship as well as the broader

neoliberalization process. As a result, the BJP has advocated for neoliberal practises such as legal sanctions to quell dissent and a dominant narrative of “anti-nationalism.” An intelligence assessment that claimed protests by foreign-funded Indian Non-Governmental Organizations (NGOs) opposing extractive industries, industrial projects, uranium mining, hydroelectric projects, and GMOs had damaged economic progress was released online shortly after the BJP's win. In 2006, Modi criticised non-governmental organisations (NGOs) to use the foreign funding to damage the government of Gujarat. The report reinforced his criticisms. He brought up the matter once more in February 2016 during a farmers' rally, claiming that NGOs were plotting to find ways to how to murder Modi, how to replace Modi government, and to disgrace him. The government banned the bank accounts of organisations like Greenpeace because they were using foreign monies for anti-national activities (FCRA). Left-wing student organisations at Jawaharlal Nehru University that oppose Hindu nationalism were accused of inciting sedition in 2016 when they allegedly screamed anti-Indian slogans at a memorial for Afzal Guru, who passed away in 2013. Even Congress party officials, like former Home Minister P. Chidambaram, have acknowledged that the police prosecution and investigation were faulty. Guru, a separatist from Kashmir, was convicted in 2001 of taking part in a plot to bomb the Indian parliament.

The Hindu nationalist movement has developed certain fissures, which anti-nationalism seeks to patch. The RSS has spoken out against the BJP's pro-corporate sector policies, arguing that measures like encouraging foreign investment in retail and manufacturing and loosening the law governing land acquisition imperil its core constituency of small business owners and farmers. While the BJP has defended its push for financialization, the RSS has criticised it. The leader of the RSS labour union, the “Bharat Mazdoor Sangh (BMS),” Vrijesh Upadhyay, asserted that “policies like pension and insurance programmes will merely create business for insurance corporations.”

What benefits will this have for the labourers? We believe the party will now take the interests of the workforce into account. If they don't, they'll be forced to deal with the consequences. The anti-nationalist discourse of the BJP tries to conceal these divisions. In some ways, this has been successful. Using the word “nationalism” as a euphemism for “Hindutva,” the RSS has been a strident supporter of the “anti-nationalism campaign.” According to RSS general secretary Bhaiyyaji Joshi, the acceptance of the nationalist rhetoric has been slowly growing, and the resultant unease among the anti-national and anti-social elements has come to light via multiple recent occurrences. In order to advance its protectionism agenda, the RSS has discovered that anti-nationalism is suitable for reappropriation. Dhananjay Munde, convener of the RSS-affiliated Swadeshi Jagran Manch, immediately criticised the BJP government's move to reverse policy and allow foreign investment in the retail sector as being no less than anti-national.

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